Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

OZAETA, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

In re Garcia, G.R. No. _____, August 15, 1961

R E S O L U T I O N

(En Banc)

BARRERA, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Arturo E. Garcia, a Filipino citizen, studied law, became a lawyer and practiced law in Spain. Later, he applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without taking the Philippine bar examinations. He cited the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Philippines and Spain and argued that he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines even without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

D E C I S I O N

(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.

§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .”

Petitioners argued that §5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the world market” and “stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar” are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the President’s E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in February 1997.  They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated §19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition