Monday, November 28, 2011

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011


R E S O L U T I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I.      THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.

Sunday, November 27, 2011

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

I.      THE FACTS

In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda Luisita and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay the peso price component of the sale, with the condition that the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did not comply with this condition.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. Hon. Leila M. De Lima (G.R. No. 199034) and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo vs. Sec. Leila M. De Lima (G.R. No. 199046), November 18, 2011 : Dissent of Justice Sereno

DISSENTING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

[Late last Tuesday, November 15, 2011, the Supreme issued an “immediately executory” Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of DOJ Department Circular No.  41 and Watchlist Order and thereby allowing the petitioners Arroyo spouses to leave the Philippines after complying with the conditions in the Resolution. The respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lime however prevented the Arroyos from leaving.

The government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, immediately filed a “Consolidated Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Temporary Restraining Order”. Petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo also filed an “Urgent Motion for Respondents to Cease and Desist from Preventing Petitioner GMA from Leaving the Country.” She also moved to cite the Respondent Secretary of Justice in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO.

On November 18, 2011, the Court conducted a special en banc session to tackle the pending incidents of the consolidated cases.]

Sunday, November 20, 2011

Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

I.      THE FACTS

[This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was then charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of his misconduct.]
          
On January 3, 2007, an anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division” of Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division. This was witnessed by several employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task.  The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured.  The diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to Chairperson David. It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice. 

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.  He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes.  In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus motion. 

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713.  He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.
          
By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials.  His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court.

II.    THE ISSUE

Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy – lawful?

III.     THE RULING

[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

[The Supreme Court then discussed the American cases that served as jurisprudential bases for its ruling:

That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega. In O’Connor the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The [U.S. Supreme] Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace.   One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography.   In this case, the US Supreme Court held that the search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection.  Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer.  The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the employer had “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic images.  The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive.  Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.]
          
Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following questions:  (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?

(1)  NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.  

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.  Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.  Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.  On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.  He described his office as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer.” Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers [CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 “Computer Use Policy (CUP)”], as in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.  This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. 

(2)  YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals with pending cases in the CSC.  A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

          Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope.  We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities.  It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement.  At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission.  The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing.  If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions.  It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice.  It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out.  Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office.   That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents.  Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail.  His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities.  We likewise find no merit in   his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint.  This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.

Atty. Evillo C. Pormento v. Joseph Ejercito "Erap" Estrada and Comelec, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, C.J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Private respondent Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [“resigned” according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738,  March 2, 2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy and filed a petition for the latter’s disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC 2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, et al., G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.