D E C I S I O N
(1st Division)
BELLOSILLO,
J.:
I. THE FACTS
A private jeep driven by
accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite City for
routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and Exala. Pfc.
Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the
occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc.
Galang proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He
then noticed a black leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long
with its sides bulging. When he asked what it contained, there was deadening
silence from the 3 accused. Nobody answered. Instead, they suddenly
became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the bag opened, which was found
out to contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter prosecuted and
convicted of illegal transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan appealed and
questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence against
him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.
II.
THE ISSUE
Was the
marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible
in evidence against the accused?
III.
THE RULING
[The 1st
Division voted 3-1 to AFFIRM the
conviction of the accused. Justices Griño-Aquino
and Quiason concurred with Justice Bellosillo’s ponencia. Justice
Cruz, by his lonesome, dissented from the majority.]
The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived
his objection to the admission of the seized marijuana because he neither
raised this issue before the trial court nor objected to the admissibility of
the marijuana when it was offered in evidence.
And even assuming that there was no such waiver,
the Court held that still Bocalan’s contention deserves scant consideration
because there are instances where search and seizure can be
made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be
the “stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De Villa].
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few questions. If
vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable
cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a
law-offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense.
According to the Court, lest it be
misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended to do away with the
general rule that no
person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the
occasion of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful
“stop-and-search” at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant
case was established in line with “Operational Bakal,” the main object of which
was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in the
possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying
the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the
occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment, the
demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as
if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear
of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused,
which did not appear normal, provided the probable
cause justifying a
more extensive search that led to the opening of the bag and the discovery of
the prohibited stuff.
[NOTE:
Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his appeal
to the Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate
Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr.]
CRUZ,
J., dissenting:
Justice Cruz
maintained the proposition in his dissent in Valmonte vs. De Villa that checkpoints and the searches and seizures incident
thereto are unconstitutional. In People vs. Exala, he expounded on
this thesis:
I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing
criminality in general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order,
any or every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched
without warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That
possibility is not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights.
In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion
to justify the search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all
vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be
committed, is actually being committed, or has just been committed and the
searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being searched or
arrested is the culprit.
I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states
or at ‘constructive borders’ near the boundary for the purpose of preventing
violations of immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the
territory, the requirements of a valid search and seizure must be strictly
observed. The only permissible exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery
has just been committed or a jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities
have to seal off all possible avenues of escape in the area. In all other
cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be allowed.
xxx. [W]e cannot retroactively validate an
illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are
illegal. That is putting the cart before the horse. I would rather see some
criminals go unpunished now and then than agree to the Bill of Rights being
systematically ignored in the oppressive checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more
important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the
accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
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