D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)
(En Banc)
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
I.
THE FACTS
Appellants were the accused
perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command
Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary (now the
Philippine National Police), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The principal witness for the
prosecution was Freddie Alejo, a
security guard employed assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon
City, where the ambush-slay happened. As a purported eyewitness, he testified
on what he saw during the fateful day, including the faces of the accused.
All the accused raised the
defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings of ballistic
and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial
investigation.
The trial court however convicted
the accused-appellants. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the
trial court. The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on
the credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the
trial court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting
of Abadilla, having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime.
II.
THE ISSUES
1. Did the CA decision comply with
the constitutional standard that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based”?
2. Was the extra-judicial confession
of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation valid?
3. Was the right to speedy
disposition of cases of the accused violated?
4. Was the eyewitness testimony of
security guard Alejo against the accused credible?
5. Was the out-of-court identification
of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a
police line-up was reliable?
6. Were the results of the ballistic
and fingerprint tests conclusive of the innocence of the accused-appellants?
7. Can the defense of alibi of the
accused prevail over their positive identification in this case?
III.
THE RULING
1.
YES, the CA decision complied with the constitutional
standard that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based”.
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed
constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the
ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each and every
assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were
left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial
court’s judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum
submitted before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA
rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common
defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of
ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense
and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What
appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the
CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments and discussion
including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such
wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor General’s position, as well
as the trial court’s insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their
claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
2. NO, the extra-judicial confession
of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation was NOT valid.
Police officers claimed that upon
arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional rights to remain
silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that
he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of his own
choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided
with one (1). However, since
these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel,
there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was
presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the
following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought
to said counsel.
Even assuming that custodial
investigation started only during Joel’s execution of his statement before
Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be
invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to
constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence
when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under
custodial investigation.
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and
assisted the latter while responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia,
Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to said
client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had
asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of the investigating
officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions, SPO2
Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from
them the date and time of Joel’s arrest and the circumstances thereof, or any
previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station, and
if said counsel inspected Joel’s body for any sign or mark of
physical torture.
3.
No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the
accused was NOT violated.
Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides that “all persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens and
covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection
than Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. However,
just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial,” “speedy disposition
of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory.
It must be stressed that in the
determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years
during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court was not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
In several cases where it was
manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution
or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the
so-called “radical relief” to keep accused from enduring the rigors and expense
of a full-blown trial. In
this case, however, appellants are not entitled to the same relief in the
absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the resolution of
their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
4.
YES, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo
against the accused was credible.
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard
Alejo, the trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the
shooting occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity
to view frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to
remember their faces (when the two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth in front of his guard post pointed their
guns at him one [1] after the other, and later when the four [4] armed men
standing around the victim’s car momentarily looked at him as he was approached
at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his positive identification in
the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom he saw
acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The
clear view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by Judge
Jose Catral Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the ocular
inspection conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court
personnel, and witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that
Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of how the assailants shot Abadilla[,]
who was inside his car, the relative positions of the gunmen and lookouts, and
his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo immediately gave
his statement before the police authorities just hours after the incident took
place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and
testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he
was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have
already been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his
earlier statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually
standing around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got
nervous only when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the
latter actually poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits,
being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies
between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the
acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than
an affidavit.
5.
YES, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants
made by the eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable.
Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we reiterate
that Alejo’s out-court-identification [of the accused] is reliable, for
reasons that, first, he was very near the
place where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to
mention that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their
guns at them; second, no competing event took place to draw
his attention from the event; third, Alejo immediately gave
his descriptions of at least two (2) of the perpetrators, while affirming he
could possibly identify the others if he would see them again, and the entire
happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no
evidence that the police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that
appellants were the suspects, except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just
pinpoint on the basis of a photograph shown to him by the police officers,
insisting that he would like to see said suspect in person. More
importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively identified appellant Joel de
Jesus independently of the previous identification made at the police station.
Such in-court identification was positive, straightforward and categorical.
6. NO, the results of the ballistic
and fingerprint tests were NOT conclusive of the innocence of the accused-appellants.
[T]he negative result of ballistic examination was
inconclusive, for there is no showing that the firearms supposedly found in
appellants’ possession were the same ones used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The
fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug were
fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants’ guilt, as it was
possible that different firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. Neither
will the finding that the empty shells and slug matched those in another
criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that they could have been
fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the
appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in another
case. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the firearms
confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for
illegal possession of firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay
of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not indispensable in this
case. Even if another weapon was in fact actually used in killing
the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog cannot escape criminal
liability therefor, as they were positively identified by eyewitness Freddie
Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.
The negative result of the
fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise
inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no prints
had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2)
fingerprints were taken from the car of Abadilla.
7. NO, the defense of alibi of the
accused CANNOT prevail over their positive identification in this case.
Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for
this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a
criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would have been
physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no
person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so
airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the
least possibility of accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.
Deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical
and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. However, none of
the appellants presented clear and convincing excuses showing the physical
impossibility of their being at the crime scene between 8:00 o’clock and 9:00
o’clock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the trial court and CA did not
err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
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