D E C I S
I O N
(En Banc)
OZAETA, J.:
I.
THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase
by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong
estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a
non-resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which
he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense
of the government.
Petitioner
Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course
of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he
gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million
proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore
cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter
filed a petition for habeas corpus
directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
II.
THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to
punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority
to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully
invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III.
THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1.
Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner
for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations
and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions
as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to
answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to
the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious
that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in
said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought
to be determined. The
contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the
inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation.
We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to
show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or
possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced
by the committee by imprisonment.
2.
YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner
for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
We find no sound reason to limit
the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session
and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The
very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable
the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment
or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to
such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to
defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted
by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to
time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3.
NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination.
Since according to the witness
himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether
testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness
to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his
liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to
the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts
thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the
protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless
he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
It is the province of the trial judge
to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him,
but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
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