R E S O L U T I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Liban, et
al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against
respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.
Petitioners alleged
that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners
cited the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which
held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting their argument that respondent
Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held
the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
Formerly, in its Decision dated
July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of
the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for
purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not
appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover,
the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and
privately-run charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board
of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as
PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
The Court however
held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264
and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that “[t]he Congress
shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or
controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The
Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a
private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare
that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID
because they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
Respondent Gordon
filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of
the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion
for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the second part
of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of
the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions
of the PNRC Charter.
II. THE ISSUE
Was it correct for
the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality
of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED
reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision
by deleting the second sentence thereof.]
NO, it was not
correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is
neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The issue of constitutionality
of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis
mota of the case. We have reiterated the rule
as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez
v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
This Court will not
touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota.
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised,
if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest]
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.
[T]his Court should
not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC
Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial restraint
on this matter, especially since there was some other ground upon which the
Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the
entity most adversely affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality,
which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a
consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this
country.
Since its enactment,
the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No.
855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D. No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643,
respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s
corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional
proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition
that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
A closer look at the
nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms
of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There
is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It
is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC
that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of
its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.
[T]his Court [must]
recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the
unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty
obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law.
Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This
constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with Article
XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate
the former. By
requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other
private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s
special status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the
State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions.
The PNRC, as a National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified
as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of
neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation
since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.
Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served
as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC
is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
In sum, the PNRC
enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in
the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The
Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it
in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the
image of the Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
declared void must therefore stay.
[Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional
in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by
deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the
office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.]
[1] Concurring with Justice Antonio Carpio, who wrote the Decision, were
then-Chief Justice Puno and Associate Justices Quisumbing, Carpio Morales,
Chico–Nazario, Velasco, and Leonardo-de Castro. Joining Associate Justice
Nachura in his Dissenting Opinion were Associate Justices Ynares-Santiago,
Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin. Then-Justice [now Chief Justice] Corona took no
part.
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