D E C I S I O
N
PUNO, J.:
I.
THE FACTS
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the
religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly
“offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s
controversial biblical interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary
religious beliefs.
Petitioner INC went to court to
question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board
to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal
by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the
respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with
grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the
three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the
subject TV series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”
Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme
Court.
II.
THE ISSUES
(1)
Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?
(2)
Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program?
III.
THE RULING
[The
Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the
CA sustained the action of the respondent Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV
Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA
insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to
review petitioner’s TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]
1.
YES, respondent Board has the power to
review petitioner’s TV program.
Petitioner contends that the term “television
program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to
review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution
which guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed.”
[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s
public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of
internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the
State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious
detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or
public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of
religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area
of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand
still.
2.
YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program.
[A]ny
act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board
to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for “attacking” either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An
examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called “attacks” are
mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as
they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent
court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited
from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's
freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
xxx.
The respondent Board may
disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it
no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the
appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad
theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is
freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of
opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
In x-rating the TV program of
the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila,
this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate
religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other
restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear
and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the
right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.”
The records
show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about
especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior
restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil
which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
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