D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR.,
J.:
I.
THE FACTS
Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products
Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever”
promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of
the four cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the
investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other
alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was
filed with the trial court without anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating
prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court
only on 22 April 1993. However, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the
proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted
in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993,
petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings
and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the
accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department
of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent
Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners
and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest
“after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent
judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this
Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have
on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To
justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo,
which stated:
In
order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the
trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent
judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of
the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and
received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary
injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to
have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable
cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of
arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express
declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not
give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts,
et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition
for mootness.
II.
THE ISSUES
1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings
and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have
been resolved?
2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse
of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining
the records of the preliminary investigation?
3. May the Supreme Court determine in
this [sic] proceedings the existence
of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa?
III.
THE RULING
[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET
ASIDE the decision and resolution of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349
Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]
1.
YES,
Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo
vs. Mogul, the motions to
suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and
to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ
shall have been resolved.
There is
nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a
criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It
merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a
petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint
or information has already been filed in Court.”
Whether
the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge
Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on
the following grounds:
This
case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence
and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering
justice.
The real and ultimate test of the
independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to
dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis of a resolution of the
petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, once
a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may
grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2.
YES,
Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary
investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution
which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would
suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the
investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and
even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.
In
this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993
with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and
received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the
certification of respondent
judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or
other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of this
case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993
directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only
the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He
did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of
probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of
probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants of arrest “after
June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes a
finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for the protection of
individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.
3.
NO,
the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa.
Ordinarily,
the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or
judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that criminal
prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final.
There
are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate the evidence to
determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest in this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that
probable cause exists, and if he did he did not have the basis therefor.
Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in this case are not
with the Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21
April 1993. The trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
No comments:
Post a Comment